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JOHN R. GIBSON, Senior Circuit Judge: 
 
          Giant Eagle, Inc. appeals from an order of the district 
court enjoining it from operating a pharmacy in its Quaker Village 
shopping center store for the duration of J. C. Penney Company's 
1978 lease, including renewals.  Giant Eagle argues that Penney's 
exclusive right to operate a pharmacy in Quaker Village ended when 
Penney's 1962 lease ended, and that Penney's exclusive right is 
unenforceable against it because it did not have notice of Penney's 
exclusive right.  We affirm. 
          In 1962 the Thrift Drug Company leased a store in the 
Quaker Village shopping center to operate a retail drugstore.  The 
lease required that Thrift Drug use the premises only for operation 
of a retail drugstore, and gave it the right to display "such 
articles as are displayed and sold by it in its other retail drug 
stores."  The lease further provided that the owner of Quaker 
Village, as lessor, would not permit another tenant to operate a 
pharmacy or fill or sell prescriptions.  The lease covenanted that 
other tenants would be Thorofare Markets, Inc., which would operate 
a supermarket, and Triple "A", a national chain variety store.  
These tenants were allowed to sell merchandise customarily sold in 
drugstores, provided that they did not compound or sell 
prescriptions, or sell merchandise limited by state law to licensed 
pharmacies.  The lease was for a term of fifteen years, and Thrift 
Drug was given the right to renew and extend the lease for three 
additional five-year terms.  Thrift Drug recorded a memorandum of 
the lease which set forth a description of the premises, the term 
of the lease, and Thrift Drug's right to renew, but made no mention 
of Thrift Drug's obligation to operate only a retail drugstore, nor 
of the shopping center's agreement prohibiting other tenants from 
operating a drugstore.  In 1969 Penney acquired Thrift Drug and all 
of its rights, including the 1962 lease. 
          In 1977 Giant Eagle entered into a lease at Quaker 
Village, which provided that it was to operate a food and grocery 
supermarket for items "customarily sold in the markets which it 
operates in the Greater Pittsburgh area."  Giant Eagle's lease also 
gave Giant Eagle the exclusive right to operate a grocery store in 
Quaker Village with the exception of the existing Thorofare store. 
           Stanley R. Gumberg, the owner of the Quaker Village 
shopping center, negotiated the lease with Giant Eagle, and stated 
that there was no reference to a pharmacy or drugstore in the lease 
provision describing Giant Eagle's use of the premises.  He also 
stated that at the time the lease was negotiated there was no 
thought or discussion of a pharmacy in Giant Eagle's store. 
          In 1975 Penney began discussing with Gumberg the 
possibility of relocating its drugstore within Quaker Village.  
Throughout these discussions, Penney insisted on keeping its 
exclusive right to operate a pharmacy.  In 1978 Penney and Gumberg 
agreed that Penney would relocate its drugstore within the shopping 
center and continue to have the exclusive right to operate a 
pharmacy.  The 1978 lease gave Penney the exclusive right to 
operate a pharmacy in Quaker Village, and provided that the 1962 
lease was to terminate one day after the new lease term started, 
thus providing an overlap between the 1962 and 1978 leases.  The 
1978 lease also covenanted that Giant Eagle was to operate a 
supermarket in the shopping center, which was a condition for 
Penney operating its new drugstore.   
          In 1990 Giant Eagle began to make plans to expand its 
supermarket in Quaker Village to include a pharmacy.  To 
accommodate Giant Eagle's plans, Gumberg asked Penney several times 
to waive its exclusive right to operate a pharmacy in the shopping 
center.  Penney consistently refused to waive its exclusive right.  
Gumberg told Giant Eagle that Penney had the exclusive right to 
operate a pharmacy in Quaker Village and that Penney refused to 
waive that right.  Despite this information, Giant Eagle began its 
construction of a pharmacy at its Quaker Village store.  Shortly 
thereafter Penney told Giant Eagle and Gumberg that it intended to 
enforce its exclusive right.  On August 13, 1992 Giant Eagle opened 
its pharmacy in Quaker Village, and Penney sued Giant Eagle to 
enjoin Giant Eagle's operation of the pharmacy. 
          The district court granted Penney a preliminary 
injunction.  J. C. Penney Co. v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 813 F. Supp. 
360 (W.D. Pa. 1992).  Giant Eagle appealed the preliminary 
injunction to this court, and we affirmed the injunction in an 
unpublished opinion.  J. C. Penney Co. v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 995 
F.2d 217 (3d Cir. 1993).  The district court later granted Penney 
a permanent injunction against Giant Eagle for the duration of 
Penney's 1978 lease, including renewals.  In granting the permanent 
injunction, the district court stated that under Penney's 1962 and 
1978 leases Penney continuously held the exclusive right to operate 
a pharmacy in Quaker Village.  The court also stated that Penney 
could enforce its exclusive right against Giant Eagle because the 
memorandum of the 1962 lease, which was filed for record, gave 
Giant Eagle constructive notice of Penney's exclusive right when 
Giant Eagle entered into its Quaker Village lease.  Giant Eagle 
appeals from the district court's grant of the permanent 
injunction. 
 
                                I. 
          Giant Eagle argues that Penney cannot enforce its 
exclusive right against Giant Eagle because Giant Eagle obtained 
its lease in Quaker Village before Penney obtained its 1978 lease 
containing the exclusive right.  Giant Eagle argues that the 1978 
lease did not preserve Penney's 1962 exclusive right for two 
reasons.  First, Giant Eagle argues that Penney cancelled its 1962 
lease and filed for record a lease cancellation agreement stating 
that the 1962 lease was null and void.  Therefore, Giant Eagle 
argues, Penney cannot rely on an exclusive right contained in a 
lease which is null and void.  Second, Giant Eagle argues that 
Penney's exclusive right is a form of restrictive covenant or 
negative easement which cannot be transferred from one location 
within Quaker Village to another.  Giant Eagle concludes that 
because Penney moved in 1978, it could not take its exclusive right 
with it. 
                                A. 
 
          In this diversity case, we must determine and apply 
Pennsylvania law, and when the issues have not been authoritatively 
determined by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, we must predict how 
it would decide those issues.  Adams v. Madison Realty & Dev., 
Inc., 853 F.2d 163, 168 (3d Cir. 1988).  Our review is de novo 
without deference to the district court.  Salve Regina College v. 
Russell, 499 U.S. 225 (1991). 
          For many years the Pennsylvania Supreme Court used 
principles of real estate law in interpreting restrictions in 
shopping center leases.  In Siciliano v. Misler, 160 A.2d 422 (Pa. 
1960), the court stated, "In restricting real estate a scrivener 
acts at his peril:  if his creation is not self-sustaining it is 
nothing."  Id. at 425.  The court rejected the argument that the 
intent of the parties should govern.  Instead, it looked at the 
plain language of the restriction, gleaning the intent of the 
parties from the language alone.  Id.  See also Food Fair Stores, 
Inc. v. Kline, 152 A.2d 661, 663 (Pa. 1959). 
          There were early rumblings of change in Great Atlantic & 
Pacific Tea Co. v. Bailey, 220 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1966), which did not 
produce a majority opinion.  See Mt. Lebanon v. County Bd. of 
Elections, 368 A.2d 648, 650-51 (Pa. 1977) (non-majority opinions 
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court are non-decisional); Vargus v. 
Pitman Mfg. Co., 675 F.2d 73, 74-75 (3d Cir. 1982) (a majority of 
the justices on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court must join an opinion 
in its entirety or it is not binding precedent).  In Great Atlantic 
& Pacific Tea Co., the Baileys, owners of a shopping center, 
granted A & P the exclusive right to operate a grocery store in 
their shopping center.  220 A.2d at 1-2.  Later, the Baileys 
purchased land next to their shopping center and rented it to 
another grocery store operator.  Id. at 2.  A & P, relying on its 
exclusive right, sued to prevent the operation of the competing 
grocery store.  Justice Eagen, with two justices joining his 
opinion and another only concurring in the result, wrote that 
courts must strictly construe exclusive rights granted in shopping 
center leases, because they restrict the use of land and such 
restrictions are traditionally not favored.  Id. at 2-3.  Following 
this reasoning, Justice Eagen concluded that A & P could not 
enforce its exclusive right against land acquired after its lease 
because A & P's exclusive right did not state explicitly that it 
applied to after-acquired land.  Id. at 3. 
          Justice Roberts, joined by two other justices, dissented 
in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.  Id. at 4.  Justice Roberts 
stated that exclusive rights are important for the development of 
modern shopping centers and that the modern approach was to 
realistically interpret the exclusive right so as to give effect to 
the intent of the parties.  Id. at 5-6 (citing Cragmere Holding 
Corp. v. Socony-Mobil Oil Co., 167 A.2d 825, 827 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1961) and other cases).  Justice Roberts rejected the 
uncritical application of the doctrine of strict construction to 
defeat the obvious purpose for which a covenant was included in a 
lease agreement.  In ascertaining the intention of the parties, he 
wrote, the restriction should be interpreted in light of the 
apparent purpose of the covenant and the conditions existing at the 
time the lease agreement was executed.  Id. at 6.  After 
considering the circumstances surrounding execution of the lease, 
Justice Roberts concluded that the parties intended for A & P to be 
the only grocery store in the shopping center and that A & P could 
enforce its exclusive right against land added to the shopping 
center after A & P's lease.  Id. at 6-7.  In essence, Justice 
Roberts was arguing for the use of contract law, rather than the 
real estate law governing land use restrictions. 
          Shortly after Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, with one justice not participating, 
evenly split over the interpretation of exclusive rights in 
shopping center leases.  Sun Drug Co. v. West Penn Realty Co., 268 
A.2d 781 (Pa. 1970).  Again, three justices argued that exclusive 
rights should be strictly interpreted because they restricted the 
use of land.  Id. at 783.  Justice Roberts continued to state that 
exclusive rights contained in shopping center leases should be 
realistically interpreted so as to give effect to the intent of the 
parties to the lease.  Id. at 785-86. 
          Exclusive rights in the shopping center lease context 
were again considered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Teodori 
v. Werner, 415 A.2d 31 (Pa. 1980).  The issue in Teodori was 
whether a tenant had an independent continuing obligation to pay 
rent when the landlord violated the tenant's exclusive right to 
sell jewelry.  Justice Roberts wrote the court's unanimous opinion.  
He recognized that the old common law of landlord and tenant 
relations based on real estate principles would recognize the 
independent obligation of the tenant to continue paying rent even 
though the landlord had violated the tenant's exclusive right.  
Teodori, 415 A.2d at 33.  Justice Roberts began his discussion by 
stating:  "It is now clear, however, that this view of landlord- 
tenant relations, incorrectly resting more on notions of property 
law than on principles of contracts, has no place in modern 
jurisprudence."  Id.  The court continued that the independent 
obligation approach must be rejected where the landlord breaks a 
promise in the lease which "is a significant inducement to the 
making of the lease by the tenant."  Id. at 34 (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Property, Introductory Note to Chapter 7 (1977)).  The 
opinion continues:   
          It is obvious that a landlord's non- 
          competition promise is critical to a 
          commercial lease agreement like the one here.  
          "The mere presence in a lease of a 
          noncompetition promise by the landlord 
          justifies the conclusion that it is essential 
          that the promise be observed if the tenant is 
          to conduct his business on the leased property 
          profitably." 
 
Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Property  7.2 cmt. b (1977)).  
In a lengthy footnote the court reiterated the importance of 
exclusive rights in shopping center leases in assuring the mix of 
quality businesses essential to a shopping center's financial 
success.  Id. at 34 n.5 (citing Cragmere Holding Corp. v. Socony- 
Mobil Oil Co., 167 A.2d 825 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961)).   
          Teodori represents a substantial change in the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's approach to shopping center leases 
with exclusive rights.  Although the court's holding is limited to 
the independent obligation for the tenant's payment of rent, the 
court applied contract-law principles for determining the intent of 
the parties and rejected the strict approach of real estate law, 
which had been the law of Pennsylvania.  See also Cimina v. 
Bronich, 537 A.2d 1355, 1358 (Pa. 1988) ("[A] lease is in the 
nature of a contract and is controlled by principles of contract 
law.") (citing Amoco Oil Co. v. Snyder, 478 A.2d 795 (Pa. 1984), 
and Ezy Parks v. Larson, 454 A.2d 928 (Pa. 1982)); Pugh v. Holmes, 
405 A.2d 897, 903 (Pa. 1979) (same).  Teodori completed what 
Justice Roberts had argued for in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 
and Justice Eagen's joining in Justice Roberts's Teodori opinion 
demonstrates the abandonment of the strict approach to exclusive 
rights which Justice Eagen adhered to in his Great Atlantic & 
Pacific Tea Co. plurality opinion. 
          Accordingly, we must analyze the relationships in this 
case under the rules announced in Teodori. 
 
                                B. 
 
          Penney is attempting to enforce against Giant Eagle its 
exclusive right to operate a pharmacy in Quaker Village contained 
in its 1978 lease, and thus, we must examine the terms of the lease 
and the circumstances surrounding the lease.  Sun Drug Co., 268 
A.2d at 785-87 (Roberts, J., opinion in support of orders); Great 
Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 220 A.2d at 5-6 (Roberts, J., dissenting). 
          In so doing, we begin with Giant Eagle's 1977 lease, 
because Gumberg negotiated this lease at the same time he 
negotiated Penney's 1978 lease.  Giant Eagle's lease stated that 
Giant Eagle "shall use the [rented] premises as a food and grocery 
supermarket for the sale of items customarily sold" in other Giant 
Eagle supermarkets in the greater Pittsburgh area.  Giant Eagle's 
lease also gave Giant Eagle, with one exception, the exclusive 
right to operate a grocery store in the Quaker Village shopping 
center.  Gumberg testified that he did not in any way contemplate 
giving Giant Eagle the right to operate a pharmacy.  Joseph 
Faccenda, Giant Eagle's Vice President, also testified that there 
were no pharmacies in any of Giant Eagle's stores in 1977.  This 
testimony, coupled with the clear language of Giant Eagle's lease, 
shows that Gumberg intended to give Giant Eagle the exclusive right 
to operate only a supermarket in Quaker Village. 
          The negotiations behind the 1978 lease between Gumberg 
and Penney, on the other hand, show that Gumberg intended to grant 
Penney an exclusive right to operate a pharmacy.  Throughout the 
negotiations concerning the move of its drugstore within Quaker 
Village, which began in the fall of 1975, Penney insisted on 
preserving its exclusive right from the 1962 lease, and insisted 
that the transaction be structured so as to maintain continuity 
with the 1962 lease.  When Gumberg submitted one draft of a lease 
to Penney that did not contain the exclusive right, Penney's 
representatives promptly insisted that the exclusive right be 
included in the lease.  Penney agreed to move on the condition that 
its exclusive right remain in full force.  As a result, the lease 
not only contained the exclusive right Penney wanted, it also 
provided that the 1962 lease would terminate one day after the 
start of the 1978 lease.  This overlap ensured the continuity in 
Penney's tenancy and exclusive pharmacy right.  Gumberg testified 
that Penney's 1978 lease gave Penney the exclusive right to operate 
a pharmacy in the Quaker Village shopping center.   
          The terms of the 1978 lease are entirely consistent with 
the parties' intent to grant Penney an exclusive pharmacy right.  
The lease stated that during the term of the lease Gumberg would 
"not use or occupy, or permit the use or occupancy of, any space" 
other than Penney's for "the operation of a drug store, or a drug 
department, in which a registered pharmacist is in attendance or 
required by law to be in attendance for any period of time," nor 
would Gumberg enter into any lease which would permit another 
tenant or sub-tenant to use space in Quaker Village for such 
purposes.  The exclusive right provision concluded by stating that 
Gumberg "covenants and agrees that rights similar to the rights 
herein granted by [Gumberg] to [Penney] are not held by any other 
tenant or occupant of space within" Quaker Village. 
          In addition, Penney's 1978 lease acknowledged that 
Gumberg had entered into a new lease with Giant Eagle to operate a 
food supermarket.  Penney's lease provided that Penney "shall be 
under no duty or obligation to open [its] store for business . . . 
unless and until the Giant Eagle food supermarket has opened or is 
about to open its store for business." 
          The circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the 1978 
lease and the language of the lease itself show that Gumberg and 
Penney intended to preserve and continue, in essentially the same 
terms, the exclusive right to operate a pharmacy which Penney 
acquired through the 1962 Thrift Drug lease.   
          The intention of the parties surrounding both leases is 
thus plainly expressed.  As Giant Eagle's 1977 lease shows, Giant 
Eagle obtained the exclusive right to operate a supermarket, and 
received Gumberg's promise that, with the exception of the 
Thorofare store, such rights would not be granted to any other 
tenant.  Gumberg granted Penney the existing pharmacy right in 
Penney's 1978 lease in the context of Giant Eagle's supermarket 
lease.  Penney's intent that it have an exclusive right to operate 
a pharmacy is clearly expressed.  While Faccenda, on behalf of 
Giant Eagle, denied knowledge of Penney's exclusive right when 
Giant Eagle executed its lease, he also stated that exclusive-right 
provisions were common in shopping center leases at that time, and 
that there were no pharmacies in Giant Eagle's stores in 1977.  In 
addition, Giant Eagle's counsel conceded that Giant Eagle knew that 
there was a 1978 lease with Penney containing exclusive-right 
language.  These expressions of intent amply demonstrate that 
Gumberg and Penney intended to preserve Penney's exclusive right 
from the 1962 lease when they entered into the 1978 lease, and that 
the 1978 lease preserves and continues that preexisting exclusive 
right.  Because Penney's 1978 lease preserves its 1962 exclusive 
right, we hold that Penney's exclusive right predates Giant Eagle's 
1977 lease.  
          Both of Giant Eagle's arguments against extension of 
Penney's 1962 exclusive right ignore Pennsylvania law which 
requires us to realistically interpret shopping center leases in 
light of the intent of the parties under contract principles.  
While the 1978 lease declared the 1962 lease null and void, this 
provision must be read with the other provisions in the 1978 lease 
and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the 1978 lease.  
The overlap of the two leases shows that although the 1978 lease 
cancelled the 1962 lease, the parties expressly intended to 
continue the exclusive pharmacy right from the 1962 lease. 
          Giant Eagle's second argument is the type of traditional 
property-law argument which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected 
in Teodori.  415 A.2d at 33-34.  The court in Teodori decided that 
courts should realistically interpret shopping center leases under 
contract-law principles, rather than traditional property law, to 
give effect to the economic realities at work in shopping centers.  
Id.  After Teodori, the intent of the parties governs the 
interpretation of shopping center leases and the traditional 
property-law restrictions on restrictive covenants and negative 
easements do not apply. 
          Thus, we conclude that the district court's finding that 
the exclusive provisions in the 1962 and 1978 leases "have 
expressly, unambiguously, and continuously since 1962" prohibited 
the landlord from using or permitting "the operation of any other 
drugstore or drug department with a registered pharmacist in 
attendance" was a fact not clearly erroneous, and a conclusion well 
drawn from the intent of the parties as expressed in the language 
of the leases, and in the negotiations with respect to the 
execution of the leases.  The district court did not err in its 
holding that Penney had the exclusive right to operate a pharmacy 
at the shopping center.  
 
                               II. 
          Giant Eagle argues that even if Penney had an exclusive 
right to operate a pharmacy, it only had notice of the right by way 
of the 1962 lease which, by its terms, would end no later than 
1993.  Therefore Giant Eagle contends that to allow Penney to 
extend the exclusive right beyond 1993 violates the rights it 
acquired under its 1977 lease. 
          As long as Giant Eagle had notice of Penney's exclusive 
right when it entered into its Quaker Village lease, it is bound by 
the proper interpretation of that right even though that is not the 
interpretation it placed on that right.  3 Milton R. Friedman, 
Friedman on Leases  28.601 (3d ed. 1990).  Accordingly, to decide 
whether Penney could extend its exclusive right beyond 1993, we 
must again look to the parties' intent.  See Sun Drug Co., 268 A.2d 
at 785-87 (Roberts, J., opinion in support of orders); Great Atl. 
& Pac. Tea Co., 220 A.2d at 5-6 (Roberts, J., dissenting).   
          Looking at all the leases, it is evident that Gumberg 
intended to grant exclusive rights to tenants operating different 
kinds of retail establishments.  The 1962 lease with Penney's 
predecessor specifically warranted that Thorofare Markets, Inc. 
would operate a supermarket and that Triple "A" would operate a 
variety store.  Giant Eagle's 1977 lease granted Giant Eagle the 
exclusive right to operate a supermarket subject to the exception 
recognized for the existing Thorofare store, and specifically 
provided that Giant Eagle's exclusive right would not cover 
restaurants or delicatessens.  Penney's 1978 lease provided that 
Gumberg had entered into a lease with Giant Eagle, and provided 
that Penney was under no duty or obligation to open, unless and 
until the Giant Eagle store was about to open.  It is apparent that 
in each lease, the tenant undertook obligations concerning its 
business, but also received from the lessor assurances about the 
other tenants within the shopping center.  Such an 
interrelationship is recognized, particularly in the footnotes, in 
Justice Robert's opinion in Teodori, 415 A.2d at 34 n.5, as well as 
in his dissent in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 220 A.2d at 5-6 
nn.2-3.   
          There was just such an interrelationship between Gumberg, 
Penney, and Giant Eagle.  Both the 1962 lease and the 1977 Giant 
Eagle lease provided for fixed terms, and gave the tenant the 
option to renew or extend for a stated number of five-year terms.  
Such renewals and extensions would, of course, include the 
exclusive rights granted to each tenant.  There is no language in 
any of the leases, nor any testimony about the lease negotiations, 
indicating that any of the parties intended to restrict the 
parties' ability to negotiate a new lease, whether it be referred 
to as a renewal or extension, at the end of the lease term.  
Indeed, the fact that Gumberg and Penney negotiated the 1978 lease 
over a three-year period demonstrates that there was no such 
restriction.   
          Similarly, there is no indication in the record of any 
intent to restrict the landlord's ability to grant exclusive rights 
to tenants, as he had granted in all the earlier leases, or to 
strip the landlord of the ability to control the mix of the 
shopping center, and to grant the exclusive rights to operate 
specific businesses as he chose.  Indeed, the evidence about the 
interrelationship between the landlord and the several tenants 
demonstrates that the parties intended to allow the landlord to 
negotiate continuations of existing leases, preserving their 
exclusive rights.  If there is any difficulty in reaching this 
conclusion, there is nothing in the 1962 lease, the 1977 Giant 
Eagle lease, or the 1978 Penney lease that permits a conclusion 
that the parties intended to allow Giant Eagle to operate a 
pharmacy, a right that Gumberg had previously granted to Penney.  
          Giant Eagle has failed to explain why the owner of Quaker 
Village would limit his ability to extend or renew an exclusive 
right within his shopping center.  Likewise, there is no reason to 
suspect that Thrift Drug agreed to limit its ability to extend or 
renew its exclusive right in the future.  The 1962 lease does not 
state that the exclusive right cannot be extended or renewed.  On 
the contrary, the language in the lease states that the exclusive 
right shall continue through any extension or renewal of the lease.  
When the several leases in this case are considered, it is evident 
that the landlord demonstrated a clear intent to control the mix of 
establishments in the shopping center, and that each of the tenants 
in entering into leases benefitted from this intent.  The 
interrelationship between the tenants, as we have discussed, was 
part of the parties' underlying intent.  We see nothing in any of 
the leases that would permit any tenant to presume that after the 
expiration of another tenant's lease, it would gain the right to 
enter into a competing business or a completely unrelated business. 
In light of these circumstances, we hold that the parties to the 
1962 lease intended to allow extension of the exclusive right as 
they might see fit in the future, and that the proper 
interpretation of the 1962 exclusive right permits its extension.  
Gumberg and Penney intended Penney's 1978 lease to extend and renew 
Penney's 1962 exclusive right.  Therefore, we also hold that 
Penney successfully extended its exclusive right for the duration 
of its 1978 lease, including any renewals.  Our interpretation 
allowing the extension of Penney's exclusive right beyond 1993 is 
binding on Giant Eagle. 
 
                               III. 
          Finally, Giant Eagle argues that it did not have notice 
of Penney's exclusive right when it entered into its Quaker Village 
lease in 1977 and, therefore, Penney cannot enforce that right 
against it. 
          Thrift Drug did not file for record the entire 1962 
lease.  Instead, it filed a memorandum of the lease as allowed by 
section 405 of title 21 of the Pennsylvania statutes.  Section 407 
of title 21 defines the effect of recording a lease memorandum.  
Section 407, which is titled "Effect of recording lease, sublease, 
agreement or memorandum," provides: 
               The recording of any such lease, 
          sublease, agreement or memorandum in 
          accordance with the provisions of this act 
          shall constitute constructive notice to 
          subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and judgment 
          creditors of the lessor of the making and of 
          the provisions of such lease, sublease or 
          agreement, including any purchase or refusal 
          provisions set forth in the lease, sublease or 
          agreement. 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 21,  407 (Supp. 1995) (emphasis added). 
          Giant Eagle argues that under section 407 the recording 
of a lease memorandum results in constructive notice only to 
"subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and judgment creditors of the 
lessor."  Giant Eagle contends that it is a lessee, not a 
subsequent purchaser, mortgagee or judgment creditor, and, 
therefore, it received no constructive notice from the recorded 
lease memorandum.  Penney responds that Giant Eagle is a 
"purchaser" within the meaning of section 407 because a lease is 
really a sale of land for a term of years. 
          A close examination of section 407 shows that the 
legislature intended the recording of a lease memorandum to give 
constructive notice of the entire lease to subsequent lessees.  
Section 407 not only defines the effect of recording a lease 
memorandum, but also the effect of filing a lease, sublease or 
lease agreement.  This is plainly reflected in the terms of section 
407.  If we were to accept Giant Eagle's interpretation of section 
407, not even the recording of the entire lease would constitute 
constructive notice to a subsequent lessee.  Under Giant Eagle's 
interpretation, there would be no way to give constructive notice 
of the terms of a lease to a subsequent lessee.  A more reasonable 
interpretation of section 407 leads to the conclusion that the 
legislature intended the term "purchasers," as used in section 407, 
to include lessees.  Indeed, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has 
so held.  Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 329 A.2d 812 
(Pa. 1974) (holding that a lease of real property is a sale under 
the Pennsylvania Consumer Protection Law).  Consequently, the 
district court did not err in holding that Giant Eagle was at least 
constructively, if not actually, aware of the exclusive provision 
in Penney's lease.   
          The record before us supports this conclusion.  Giant 
Eagle's Vice President, Faccenda, stated that while he was not 
involved with exclusive rights in 1977, Giant Eagle had a staff of 
real estate and legal people who were expected to handle these 
functions and to ensure that everything that Giant Eagle was doing 
was proper and legal.  He would expect them to find a recorded 
document which restricted the use of the premises Giant Eagle was 
about to lease.  He was aware when Giant Eagle moved into Quaker 
Village in 1977 that there was a Thrift Drug store there and that 
it was logical for Thrift to have a lease, but he would not have 
paid attention to details like exclusive rights in other leases.  
This testimony is sufficient to raise an inference that when Giant 
Eagle signed the lease in 1977 it knew of Penney's exclusive right 
in the 1962 lease.  Also, Faccenda's knowledge that exclusive 
rights were common in 1977, as well as the exclusive right 
contained in Giant Eagle's lease, support the inference that this 
is a subject about which Giant Eagle and its representatives would 
have been interested.  The record makes clear that both Penney and 
Giant Eagle were sophisticated lessees, and indeed were involved in 
some three other disputes in which Giant Eagle was seeking to 
enforce exclusive rights to operate pharmacies in other leases.  
While Giant Eagle argues that a single lessee would have no right 
to obtain information from a landlord about other lessees, the 
record is to the contrary.  In Penney's letter to Gumberg's 
attorney on January 12, 1978, Penney requested copies of the use 
and exclusive-right provisions from the leases of other tenants 
within the shopping center.  There was strong evidence in the 
record to support the district court's finding that Giant Eagle was 
constructively, if not actually, aware of the exclusive-right 
provisions in Penney's leases. 
          We think it also follows that when Giant Eagle decided to 
open a pharmacy in 1990 it was bound by the exclusive rights 
granted to other tenants.  Giant Eagle conceded that in 1977 it was 
not operating a pharmacy in any of its stores and its lease 
certainly did not give them a right to operate a pharmacy.  In 1977 
Giant Eagle knew of Penney's rights under the 1962 lease.  From 
1978, well before Giant Eagle operated pharmacies in its 
supermarkets and in 1990 when it decided to open a pharmacy, it had 
constructive notice of Penney's exclusive right as granted both in 
the 1978 and 1962 leases.   
          Accordingly, we affirm the order of the district court 
granting the permanent injunction. 
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STAPLETON, J., dissenting: 
          I respectfully dissent. 
          I start with the proposition that restrictive covenants 
in prior conveyances are binding only against future lessees with 
actual or constructive notice before the lease is signed.  See 
Finley v. Glenn, 154 A. 299, 301 (Pa. 1931); see generally3 M. Friedman, 
Friedman on Leases  28.601 (3d ed. 1990).  J.C. 
Penney's lease agreement thus will not support the district court's 
injunction in the absence of actual or constructive notice to Giant 
Eagle.   
          I believe the record contains insufficient evidence to 
permit a finding that Giant Eagle had actual notice of J.C. 
Penney's exclusive when Giant Eagle signed its lease in 1977.  In 
any event, as the court acknowledges, the district court made no 
finding that Giant Eagle had actual notice at that time.  Based on 
the particular facts of this case, however, we may assume, 
arguendo, that Giant Eagle had actual notice of the exclusive in 
1977.  We may also assume, without deciding, that 21 Pa. Stat. Ann. 
 407 applies here and that Giant Eagle had constructive notice in 
1977 of the existence and provisions of J.C. Penney's 1962 lease, 
including the restrictive covenant.  Finally, we may also assume 
without deciding that J.C. Penney's 1978 lease effectively 
continued the 1962 pharmacy exclusive in the new location within 
the shopping center--that is, that the restrictive covenant runs 
with the restricted land retained by the landlord (the entire 
shopping center), not with the premises originally leased by J.C. 
Penney in 1962.  Thus, had J.C. Penney merely moved to a new 
storefront within the shopping center in 1978 but otherwise 
retained all the provisions of the 1962 lease, including the 
original term and renewal rights provisions, we may assume that 
Giant Eagle could have been bound by the restrictive covenant for 
the maximum 30-year term of the 1962 lease. 
          While the 1978 lease alone, independently of the 1962 
lease, may bind co-tenants who signed leases after 1978, it cannot 
bind a pre-existing tenant such as Giant Eagle.  The critical 
issue, then, is whether J.C. Penney's 1978 lease could operate as 
an extension of the restrictive covenant in the 1962 lease beyond 
its original maximum term of 30 years.   
          In 1977, Giant Eagle had notice that J.C. Penney's 1962 
lease would expire, at the latest, 30 years from its effective 
date, or August 31, 1993.  Giant Eagle cannot be bound by any 
extension of the restrictive covenant beyond that date because 
J.C. Penney's lease did not include any such extension right at the 
time Giant Eagle signed its lease.   
          Pennsylvania's lease recording statute explicitly 
requires that a memorandum of lease must contain the expiration 
date of the final period for any right of extension or renewal.  21 
Pa. Stat. Ann.  405.  Notice of the maximum term of a lease is 
important because the term partly defines or circumscribes the 
rights of a purchaser, mortgagee, or judgment creditor--or, as I 
have assumed, a tenant to be bound by a co-tenant's restrictive 
covenant.  A purchaser with notice of a recorded lease takes the 
property subject to that lease only for the maximum term; that is, 
the purchaser has bought the right to hold the property free of the 
leasehold interest after the final expiration date indicated in the 
recorded lease agreement.  Similarly, a tenant who enters into a 
shopping center lease agreement, with at least constructive notice 
of a co-tenant's lease containing a restrictive covenant, has 
bought the right to be free from the restrictive covenant at the 
expiration of the co-tenant's lease as recorded. 
          Allowing a tenant to extend a binding restrictive 
covenant by merely extending the term of its lease beyond the 
original, maximum term would operate to bind a co-tenant to a 
restrictive covenant for a period of time during which the co- 
tenant had no notice it could be bound.  There is no principled 
difference between binding a co-tenant to such an extension and 
binding a co-tenant to a restrictive covenant of which it had no 
notice at all in the first instance: either way, a co-tenant's 
property rights are more restricted than they were disclosed to be 
at the time the co-tenant entered into its lease agreement. 
          Giant Eagle signed its lease in 1977, half-way through 
the maximum 30-year term of J.C. Penney's 1962 lease, with  notice 
that J.C. Penney's pharmacy exclusive would prohibit Giant Eagle 
from operating a pharmacy until 1993 at the latest.  The district 
court's holding necessarily implies that Giant Eagle had no right 
to expect, in 1977, that it could operate a pharmacy department 
after 1993 for the remaining 24 years of its lease.  In other 
words, the district court's rule would have given J.C. Penney and 
the landlord the right at any time prior to 1993 to decide between 
themselves to bind Giant Eagle to an extension of the restrictive 
covenant without obtaining Giant Eagle's consent.  Such a rule 
cannot be correct because it operates retroactively to restrict a 
tenant's property rights under its lease agreement. 
          I would accordingly decide that, at least with respect to 
pre-existing tenants such as Giant Eagle, J.C. Penney's 1978 lease 
did not extend the pharmacy exclusive beyond the expiration of the 
maximum term of the 1962 lease on August 31, 1993.  We may assume 
that Giant Eagle was thus in violation of the restrictive covenant 
when it opened its pharmacy department in August 1992, and when the 
district court granted J.C. Penney's motion for a preliminary 
injunction the following month.  However, by the time the district 
court ordered permanent injunctive relief in January 1995, 
J.C. Penney's exclusive was no longer binding against Giant Eagle.  
J.C. Penney's exclusive, therefore, cannot be a basis for affirming 
the permanent injunction.  I would reverse the judgment of the 
district court, thereby vacating the permanent injunction.           
